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Abstract
Consensual union, also known as cohabitation, has become more frequent in recent 
decades in Brazil and many other countries. In this context, some studies have analyzed 
the impact of marriage on women’s wages. This article analyzes the effects of marital 
status on Brazilian women’s wages by specifically investigating the individual characte-
ristics of these effects using data from the 2000 Brazilian Census Database. This study 
concludes that wages differ by up to 15 per cent between married and single women 
and up to 3 per cent between married and cohabiting women. 
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Resumo
A união consensual, também conhecida como coabitação, é um fenômeno que tem sido 
cada vez mais frequente nas últimas décadas, não somente no Brasil, mas também nos 
mais diversos países. Ao mesmo tempo, surgiram estudos sobre o impacto do casamento 
no salário das mulheres. O presente artigo analisa o efeito do estado civil nos salários 
das mulheres que residem no Brasil. Para tanto, esse estudo utiliza as características 
individuais para a análise dos efeitos colhidas através do Censo Brasileiro realizado em 
2000. As conclusões mostram que existe diferença salarial de até 15% entre mulheres 
casadas e solteiras e essa diferença é de até 3% entre mulheres casadas e coabitantes.
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1. Introduction
In recent decades, several transformations have occurred in family 
formation patterns, such as the dissolution of unions and familial 
arrangements, in many countries, including Brazil. Following the 
growth of women’s labor market participation after the 1960s, the-
se changes in the family unit have become more common. More 
specifically, decreases in fertility, increases in the propensity of in-
formal unions, increases in marital age, and increases in the number 
of divorces are strong indications of these transformations (Becker, 
1992; Falcão and Soares, 2008).
In Latin America, consensual unions have existed since the colonial 
period, and a considerable number of these unions have never been 
legalized, thus resulting in informal unions that are independent of 
marriage (Martin, 2002). In 1988, the Federal Constitution of Brazil 
recognized informal unions as stable unions, giving cohabitants the 
same legal rights that are granted to officially married couples. Until 
then, consensual unions were typically associated with lower socio-
economic classes and were not recognized by civil authorities. Since 
this new legislation, however, members from other socioeconomic 
classes have adopted informal unions as an alternative to civil mar-
riage, increasing the number of consensual unions. 
With the increasing popularity of informal unions and the lack of 
studies that are directed specifically at Brazilian women, this study 
utilizes data from the 2000 Demographic Census1 to analyze pos-
sible characteristics that explain wage differences among women 
based on their civil status. The objective of this study is to explain 
the effects of civil status on Brazilian women’s salaries by evaluating 
individual characteristics and analyzing specific social and economic 
variables to identify possible differences between the earnings and 
activities of married, single and cohabitating women. 
Previous studies on male wages show that married men and cohabi-
ting men earn higher salaries than do single men (Zavodny, 2008). 
Hersch and Stratton (2000) justify this increase in the remuneration 
1 Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statis-
tics, IBGE). We used the 2000 Demographic Census, the most recent microdata available at 
the time of this research. Results from 2010 Census were not available by the time of this 
research, which would substantially contribute to analyze differences on labor markets that 
occurred during the last decade. Future research goals include making a comparative analysis.
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by the household specialization that usually occurs after a couple is 
united: the man goes to the labor market and the woman, even if 
engaged in the labor market, is responsible for household care and 
home production (Becker, 1973). This division would increase male 
productivity for market labor and, consequently, generate higher wa-
ges for married men compared with single men. However, the same 
effect is not well understood for women. In other words, would 
married women earn more than single women because, like men, 
they have become more productive, increasing their remuneration in 
the labor market, or would they earn less than single women because 
they must accommodate two different demands (labor and home 
production for a couple)? The results for the United States show 
that single women receive higher wages than married and cohabiting 
women (Madalozzo, 2008), and the explanation for this difference 
is related to the fact that single women have more time to invest in 
their careers when compared with married or cohabiting women, 
who have double demands placed on their time: home and work. 
This study contributes to the literature by evaluating the impact of 
marital status on income differentials among Brazilian women. Our 
analysis uses the ordinary least squares (OLS) method to control for 
two selection problems: labor market participation and civil status 
choice. We also show that the Brazilian environment for women is 
completely different from that in the United States. Salaries differ 
by up to 15 per cent between married and single women and up to 3 
per cent between married and cohabitating women, with both diffe-
rences favoring married women. Our conclusions are founded upon 
the different signals captured by distinct labor market settings.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing 
literature, and section 3 briefly analyzes the base data in this stu-
dy and provides a descriptive analysis of the data to compare the 
socioeconomic characteristics of each group. Section 4 discusses 
the analytical methodology of the study, and section 5 presents the 
estimated regressions and result comparisons for each sub-sample 
based on Oaxaca-Kuhn wage decomposition. Section 6 presents the 
conclusions.
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2. Previous Literature
This section is divided into two parts. The first presents a brief 
description of the social and economic changes that have encouraged 
the observed increase in the number of informal unions in Brazil, 
while the second presents a brief summary of the existing literature 
and summarizes the principal variables analyzed in prior studies, 
especially those variables that have been shown to influence women’s 
marital status choices, women’s participation in the labor market, 
and salary differences. 
2.1  Historical Context
For many years, marriage was viewed as a contract that established 
morals and rules of conduct and assigned marriage a specific role 
within a patriarchal society, that is, to perpetuate dominant and 
subordinate roles for men and women, respectively. The marriage 
contract not only negotiates a woman’s individual sexual authority 
but also weds political and economic rights and a woman’s rights to 
manage her own existence. These facts show the paternalistic cons-
truction of the marriage contract, which guaranteed male superiority 
and the husband’s power.
The main changes in social behavior in the context of marriage began 
during the first and second world wars, wherein women often had to 
assume men’s roles. With the consolidation of the capitalist system 
in the nineteenth century, some laws began to uphold the rights of 
women. The entry of women into the labor market in the mid-1960s 
helped to further change sexist perceptions in society. However, 
even with these achievements, women continue to face exploitation 
and inequality at home, at work, and in the eyes of the law. 
Since the 1960s in Brazil, the number of separations and divorces 
has increased. Since 1942, according to civil code, separation wi-
thout dissolution of the union or divorce was permitted (Berquó, 
1998). In the 1950s and 1960s, the number of consensual unions 
increased among the poorest classes. During this period, consensual 
unions became an alternative for people who lacked the resources or 
were not interested in assuming the rights and obligations demanded 
by formal unions (Medeiros and Osorio, 2000). Marriage creates a 
series of transaction costs that, in turn, generate barriers for some 
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individuals (as the double shift explored in Ferber and Birnbaum, 
1977; Becker, 1965). In December 1977, divorce was established by 
law 6515 in Brazil.2 This new law was created to reduce the number 
of informal unions by removing some of the impediments to formal 
union; however, instead, there was an increase in the number of 
informal unions. 
It was not until in 1988 that Brazil’s constitution formally recogni-
zed this type of relationship as a stable union. In the 1990s, women’s 
participation in the labor market increased, adding participation in 
the labor force to the responsibilities of being solely responsible for 
the household, thereby creating a double workday for women. In 
1995, according to Berquó (1998), the rate of consensual unions 
was 23.5 per cent, and close to a quarter of these unions constitu-
ted informal relations. According to the 2000 Instituto Brasileiro 
de Geografia e Estatística (Brazilian Institute of Geography and 
Statistics, IBGE) data, 28.6 per cent of the unions in Brazil among 
people who were older than 15 were informal.
In Brazil, the number of informal unions has significantly increased 
in recent years. The gross marriage rate declined between 1979 and 
1994, with the greatest decline in 1983, which was the worst year 
of the ‘crisis of the lost decade,’ when household income decre-
ased significantly. Today, consensual union is not associated with 
low income. Young people who principally live in urban centers see 
consensual union as a way to continue their life as a single person or 
as a type of ‘experimental marriage’ to test the feasibility of their 
life as a couple. According to Berquó (1998), this trial may become 
permanent, a break with traditional norms and values.
2 The divorce request in Brazil may be conducted by both members of the couple or by one 
member alone. Designation for the first type of request is “consensual” and, for the second, 
“litigious”. These different possibilities may affect the premarital search of a partner, as 
described in Rasul (2006).
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2.2  Previous Empirical Research
According to empirical studies, consensual unions have become 
more frequent in recent decades in Brazil and in the United States 
(Madalozzo, 2008) and Europe (Kiernan, 2002). Legislation in some 
countries, including Brazil,3 gives cohabitants the same legal rights 
that are accorded married couples. Cohabitants that spend a given 
amount of time together are, under the law, officially considered 
to be in a stable union. As a consequence, some couples opt not to 
formalize their marriages because, as cohabitants, they are already 
considered married. 
The empirical literature shows a premium associated with marriage 
when men are the object of the study, whereas similar studies on 
women are inconclusive (Korenman and Neumark, 1991). When stu-
dying the effect of choices regarding marital status on women’s ear-
nings, we must consider the factors that influence women’s decisions 
to establish either a formal (marriage) or an informal (cohabitation) 
relationship. However, independent of the formal or informal status 
of marriage, when a man and a woman make the decision to live to-
gether, the optimal division of work and its effects on the individual 
wages deserve study. 
As Becker (1965) posits, the most efficient division, in view of 
aggregate consumption, is to dedicate one person fully to the la-
bor market – the person who receives the higher payment for his/
her labor supply – and the other person to household produc-
tion. According to Becker (1985), even the additional effort wo-
men spend taking care of children and domestic tasks would 
be sufficient to reduce their hourly wage when compared with 
male wages. Chiappori (1988) explores the subject of labor sup-
ply by family members considering a collective approach that 
allows different sets of utility functions to be maximized. 
Within his framework, it was possible to model the couple’s de-
cision over individual labor supply and Pareto-efficient result. 
Furthermore, decisions regarding continuing or breaking the mar-
riage contract may be posed in a model (as in Lundberg and Pollak, 
1993) with separate spheres of bargaining power where the marriage 
3 Since the 1990s, any couple living together for more than a year has the same rights as an 
officially married couple (Código n. 9278, March 10, 1996).
The Impact of Civil Status on Women’s Wages in Brazil                                               463
Est. Econ., São Paulo, vol. 42, n.3, p. 457-487, jul.-set. 2012
contract may not be broken (as posed in the models of threat point 
- see Manser and Brown, 1980). However, the equilibrium result 
may be a non-cooperative point where traditional gender roles, e.g., 
division of work, would be preserved. Rasul (2006) explores the 
subject of the marriage market over changes in the divorce laws from 
consensual to unilateral request. At the same time, Rasul’s (2006) 
model predicts an initial increase in divorce rates that would stabi-
lize over time with an increase in the benefits of better searching 
and the resultant creation of a selection effect that would result in a 
more efficient searching process and more stable marriages.
Another question about marriage for women, even today, is its as-
sociation with maternity. In most cases, women are responsible for 
childrearing, even in the case of divorce. Some studies have consi-
dered the impact of children on women’s wages (Moore and Wilson, 
1982) and, consequently, the impact of marriage (Hill, 1979); howe-
ver, according to Bumpass, Sweet and Cherlin (1991), among North 
Americans, over 10 per cent of cohabiting couples have children and 
almost 25 per cent bring children from other relationships into their 
unions. These figures provide evidence that motherhood is no longer 
exclusively linked to marriage.
With respect to the choice of conjugal status, earlier studies affirm 
that cohabitation is common in large urban centers. In other words, 
women who live in large metropolises have a greater tendency to 
cohabit. Since the period following military dictatorship in Brazil, 
societal transformation has intensified and young people who live in 
urban centers see consensual unions as a way to continue single life 
or construct an ‘experimental marriage’ (Berquó, 1998).
Madalozzo (2008) used Current Population Survey (CPS) 
data from 1995, 1997, and 1999 about American women be-
tween 20 and 64 years of age and analyzed the wage differen-
ces between married and cohabiting women. Using switching 
regression methods and the Oaxaca decomposition, this stu-
dy shows the existence of a financial penalty for married wo-
men. The salaries of married and cohabiting women differ 
from 49 per cent to 53 per cent, clearly favoring cohabiting wo-
men. In other words, women are penalized for being married. 
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The literature on wage differences among Brazilian women according 
to marital status is not well developed. Studies have been conducted 
on the declining number of formal unions (Miranda-Ribeiro, 1993), 
the impact of increasing numbers of consensual unions (Greene and 
Rao, 1992), and the reasons for the increased popularity of consen-
sual unions (Berquó, 1998) in Brazil; however, no study has focused 
on the wage differences of women according to their civil status. 
The literature on this topic is currently restricted to international 
studies.
The next section presents a brief analysis of the data used in this 
study and a descriptive analysis of the data. This analysis was sepa-
rately undertaken for each marital status; that is, the means, propor-
tions, and variances of three different samples - married, single, and 
cohabiting – were analyzed to compare each group’s socioeconomic 
characteristics. 
3. Descriptive Analysis
An important detail in the data analysis is the scheme used to clas-
sify cohabitants, determining whether a woman more closely re-
sembles a married or single woman. In certain aspects, such as work 
profile, hours worked, and labor market participation as a whole, 
cohabitants resemble single women. On the other hand, conside-
ring years of education, race, and number of children, these women 
appear married. Considering these disparities, it is reasonable to 
separate the sample into two sub-samples. Thus, the analysis will be 
conducted in two parts: comparisons between married and single 
women and comparisons between married and cohabitant women. 
We will use a group of married women as the basis of comparison 
for the single and cohabitant women. 
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Table 1 - Descriptive Analysis of the Data
Source: IBGE, data tabulated by the author. 
Notes: 1) Standard deviations from the mean (SD) are in parentheses.
2) Bracketed values represent the number of observations used to calculate the correspon-
ding variable.
Single Cohabitant Married
Age
29.46 34.33 41.48
-10.48 -10.76 -11.8
Annual salary
5,184.02 4,382.46 5,689.35
-9,464.83 -12,656.78 -14,704.05
Annual salary (women who work and have income)
5,427.34 4,718.13 6,501.38
-9,615.99 -13,072.11 -15,549.56
[536,014] [522,701] [1,221,837]
Hours of work per week
40.74 40.61 38.48
-13.59 -15.85 -15.43
Hourly wages
3 2.55 3.43
-7.24 -8.49 -10
Hourly wages (women who work and have income)
3.15 2.74 3.92
-7.38 -8.78 -10.6
[536,014] [522,701] [1,221,837]
Number of children
0.27 2.75 3.3
-0.77 -2.39 -2.77
Region (%)
     North 5.17 9.8 5.23
     Northeast 28.61 31.41 24.86
     Central-west 6.16 7.89 6.87
     South 13.05 13.13 18.3
     Southeast 47.01 37.77 44.75
Years of schooling (%)
No schooling 6.52 13.53 12.01
1 to 4 years 16.59 36.03 38.39
5 to 8 years 19.24 29.33 21.63
9 to 11 years 39.24 16.86 19.41
12 to 15 years 15.02 3.23 6.58
Over 15 years 3.39 1.02 1.97
Status in the home (%)
Head of Household 18.86 26.46 18.21
Wife / Partner - 67.13 78.38
Other 81.14 6.41 3.41
Ethnicity (%)
White 56.48 44.68 61.02
Black 7.24 8.8 5.07
Asian 0.68 0.22 0.52
Parda 35.06 45.57 33.06
Indigenous 0.26 0.72 0.33
Resident in an urban center (%) 85.06 82.21 77.78
Number of observations 964,968 1,310,228 3,265,541
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This study uses data from the 2000 Brazilian Demographic Census. 
The Demographic Census is a national research project that was 
developed by the IBGE and executed over 10 years to collect infor-
mation about the entire Brazilian population. We used the sample 
micro data made available by IBGE. 
The sample in this study contains observations on women who were 
between 20 and 64 years of age and who belong to an economically 
active population. These women were divided into married (58.93 
per cent), single (17.42 per cent), and cohabitation (23.65 per cent) 
groups. As a first step, we analyzed the social and economic charac-
teristics of women living in Brazil based on marital status to identify 
the relevant features that distinguish the earnings of women who live 
in consensual unions, single women, and legally married women. 
As shown in Table 1, with respect to income, we see that both the 
annual salary and the hourly wage of married women are higher than 
those of single women and those women in informal unions have the 
lowest pay. Considering only women who work and have income, 
cohabiting women earn an average annual salary that is nearly 38 per 
cent less than married women. Single women earn approximately 20 
per cent less than formally married women. Single women and wo-
men in consensual unions work many more hours, further increasing 
the difference between the average hourly wages of these women 
when compared with those who are officially married. The wages of 
married women are less than the wages of single women and cohabi-
tants by approximately 24 per cent and 43 per cent, respectively. 
In Table 1, when we examine the ages of Brazilian women, we see 
that the mean age of single women is 11 years lower than that of 
married women; however, the mean age of women who are living in 
consensual unions is approximately 7 years lower than that of mar-
ried women. In other words, the phenomenon of consensual union 
takes place largely among younger people; however, it is noteworthy 
that this phenomenon extends to older people in Latin America, 
which is in contrast to many developed countries, such as the United 
States and some European countries (Martin 2002).
Today, the view that official marriage is highly related to maternity 
persists. This view suggests that married women should have a gre-
ater number of children than cohabiting women. The data in Table 1 
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show that married women have, on average, a greater number of chil-
dren; however, this difference is not significant. Whereas married 
women have a mean of 3.3 children, cohabiting women have a mean 
of 2.75 children. Couples in consensual unions have children without 
formalizing their marriages, suggesting that consensual union now an 
alternative to legal marriage rather than a trial period. With respect 
to the average number of children, single women have, on average, 
fewer children. 
If we analyze the educational levels of Brazilian women using the 
data in Table 1, women with the highest levels of education, mostly 
in the range of 9 to 11 years of study with a relatively elevated per-
centage in the range of 12 to 15 years of study, opt to remain single. 
Women in consensual unions were concentrated among women of 
lower education levels or among those who did not finish junior high 
school, with the majority having 5 to 8 years of schooling. 
Observing the data on household status, a greater proportion of wo-
men in formal and informal unions are classified as wife (78.58 
per cent) or partner (67.13 per cent). However, among cohabiting 
women, the proportion of those in the role of head of household4 is 
greater than that in married and single women, indicating that these 
women contribute substantially to the economic well-being of their 
families.5 
In an examination of the ethnicity of Brazilian women, consensual 
unions are chosen, in large part, by black and parda women. White 
women appear to prefer to remain single or forming formal unions. 
In Brazil, since the colonial period, informal relationships have been 
prevalent among black women. During this period, slaves who were 
involved with white men did not establish formal unions. The chil-
dren of these unions often did not know for certain who their fa-
thers were, and the idea of an informal union was part of the cultu-
ral heritage, as a break and a type of independence from traditional 
European customs. Until recently, racial discrimination has reduced 
the economic potential of black and mulatto women compared with 
that of white women. 
4 Heads of household are women who are considered to be responsible for the household or 
who are considered so by other residents.
5  Nearly 27 per cent of cohabiting women are the heads of households; however, among mar-
ried and single women, the proportion is near 18 per cent.
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Earlier studies (Berquó, 1998) show that the increase in the number 
of consensual unions is a phenomenon of large urban centers. When 
analyzing the urban center variable, we see a significant difference 
in the proportion of women in consensual unions between urban 
centers and rural areas. Living in an urban center may, therefore, 
increase the likelihood of women to opt for an informal union, which 
would impact earnings. As a result, we decided to include this va-
riable in the model. 
The next section describes this study’s methodology, which was di-
vided into three parts: our econometric methods, issues in the selec-
tion of women with respect to their labor market participation and 
choice of civil status, and potential corrections for these issues.
4. Methodology 
This study uses OLS to estimate the coefficients of a multiple li-
near regression and analyze the differences in women’s wages by 
civil status. OLS uses a mathematical optimization technique to 
find the best fit for a data set by minimizing the sum of the squares 
of the differences between the fitted model and the observed data, 
where
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To analyze the wage differences between women who are married, 
single, and those living in consensual unions, we use two separa-
te sub-samples, one to compare married with single women, and 
another to compare married with cohabitant women. A regression 
was estimated using the natural logarithm of hourly wages as the 
dependent variable (in reais) as explained by the independent varia-
bles of experience,6 experience squared, number of children,7 level 
of education,8 race,9 the woman’s geographic region of residence,10 
6   Constructed variable: age - number of years of study - six.  
7   Considering only children born alive.
8       These categories include uneducated, from 1 to 4 years of study, from 5 to 8 years of study, 
9 to 11 of study, 12 to 15 years of study, and more than 15 years of study. Excluded category: 
uneducated. 
9  These categories include black, parda, yellow, and indigenous. Excluded category: white.
10 These categories include southeast, south, central-west, north, and northeast. Excluded 
category: southeast.
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position in the family,11 and occupation. To refine the analysis, the 
sample was separated into two sub-groups - women who work full 
time (40 hours or more per week) and women who work part time 
(less than 40 hours per week). This division allows us to investigate 
the behavioral profiles of these women and the signals that they send 
to the market regarding their dedication (in time) to work. 
4.1 Selection Problems
The first stage of this study estimated a multiple linear regression in 
which the analyzed responding variable was the natural logarithm of 
hourly wages (in reais); however, an analysis of the effects of multi-
ple linear regressions may generate biased results. Previous studies 
point to a selection problem among women regarding their labor 
market participation.12 Women have different patterns of selection 
in the labor market given that their participation is largely discon-
tinuous due to having children, which can lead women to leave the 
labor market. It is necessary to consider the possibility of differences 
in unobserved characteristics and abilities because these differences 
influence women’s participation in the labor market and, consequen-
tly, their wage levels.
Women with different skill characteristics choose whether to enter 
the workforce. Although raising small children increases labor costs, 
the level of education and experience may have the opposite effect. 
To estimate the probability of labor market participation, we use the 
number of children who are younger than 6 years of age, indicators 
of education, indicators of race, experience, and experience squared. 
Previous studies show that black women have a greater participation 
in the labor market, primarily because their income is required for 
survival rather than just improved quality of life. To account for this 
phenomenon, race indicators were included. In addition to these 
intuitive variables, marital status indicators were also included. The 
expected sign for the marital status indicator is positive because the 
theory of domestic production affirms that the division of labor is 
most efficient when each family member devotes his or her time to 
the most productive work. Men usually receive greater compensation 
for their time in the labor market than in domestic production.
11  These categories include head of household and others. Excluded category: others.
12  For more information on selection problems, see Vella (1998) and Heckman (1979).
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The expectation is that married women spend more time in hou-
sehold activities and less time in the labor market. These phenomena 
will result in different probabilities for work based on marital status. 
Another problem in this study is the selection of conjugal status. 
Given certain characteristics, women generally choose to live in 
consensual unions or marriage. The choice among different marital 
statuses may also reflect unobservable characteristics of the sub-
sample. If these unobservable characteristics act as much on choice 
of conjugal status as on the wage level, disregarding these influences 
can bias the study results. 
Addressing this problem is important because if we consider that 
women who are more capable choose to marry and those who are 
less capable choose consensual unions, ignoring this type of selection 
would incorrectly include a bias for ability in the estimated coeffi-
cient for conjugal status. Addressing this issue can correct the bias 
and provide the actual effects of marriage on salary.  Earlier studies 
point to an increase in consensual unions as typical in urban centers 
(Chevan, 1996). Also, descriptive analysis shows that the mean age 
of cohabitants is less than the mean age of married women. To es-
timate the probability of a woman choosing an informal union, the 
indicators of age, living in an urban center, education, and race were 
used in this study. 
4.2 Correction of Selection Problems
To correct the problems of selection in labor force participation and 
choice of marital status, bivariate probit regression13 was used in 
the model specified by Lee (1983). We used the inverse Mills ra-
tio (IMR) as a regressor in the wage equation. The IMR is defined
as the following: 
)/'(
)/'(
0
0


Z
Z
IMR

                                 (2)
13 If the selection problem was unique, as usually it is when estimating a Mincerian equation 
for female wages, we could use a univariate probit regression, as explained in Heckman 
(1979). However, having two selection sources, it is more adequate to use a bivariate probit 
regression or to run two probit models, one for each selection problem. We used both me-
thods, and the results did not differ significantly; therefore, we choose the more sophistica-
ted solution, a bivariate probit correction that generates two IMRs, correcting both selection 
difficulties.
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where 'Z   represents the regressors of the probit equation and 0
is the standard deviation of the residuals of the original equation 
that contains the problem of selection bias. When we use this cor-
rection method by including the IMR in the equation, the individual 
marginal effect of each dependent variable and the indirect effect 
of the IMR14 coefficient should be considered. Note that instead 
of having an identified model, some authors suggest that the probit 
regression must include at least one variable that is not a regressor 
in the multiple linear model. The variables for the bivariate probit 
model that indicate a woman with a child under 6 years of age were 
used for the probit model of participation in the workforce, whereas 
residing in an urban center was used for the probit model of choosing 
civil status. In the multiple linear regression model, these variables 
were excluded. 
Note that in the new regression of salary, the two IMRs are included 
in the regression such that the estimated coefficients can be inter-
preted using the correction to calculate the marginal effects. The ob-
tained results were used to predict wage differences by marital sta-
tus using the Oaxaca (1973)-Kuhn(1987) decomposition, as is com-
mon in the wage differential literature (see Allegretto and Arthur, 
1999; Koreman and Neumark, 1991; Kun, 1987, among others).
To decompose the wage difference into two parts (explained and 
unexplained), the Oaxaca-Kuhn methodology requires the estima-
tion of two Mincerian equations, one for:
 ln( )
i i i i
i
W X u                                                          (3)
where Wi is the hourly wage for worker i, Xi is the vector of indivi-
dual characteristics, β is the regression coefficient and ui is the error. 
These estimations will result in two sets of estimated coefficients, 
one for each group. 
The individual characteristics of the sample and the estimated co-
efficients can be used to obtain the discrimination factor, which is 
the difference in the observed average of women’s wages between 
14 This subject is discussed extensively in Hoffman and Kassouf (2005), Saha, Capps and 
Byrne (1997), and Heckman (1979).
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one group (married) and another group (cohabitant or single),15 as 
shown below: 
 
/sin^ ^ ^married cohabiting gle
married married
j ji ij ij
j j
D X X   
            
(4)
In this study, we use the Oaxaca-Kuhn method to calculate the wage 
differences between married and cohabitant/single women. 
To identify the contribution of each variable to the explained and 
unexplained gap, this study uses the Yun (2005) method, as used in 
the Scorzafave and Pazello (2007) paper. On the basis of the Oaxaca 
and Ramson (1999) study, Yun (2005) identified an indetermination 
problem and proposed a methodology to disentangle the identifi-
cation problem. Based on the normalized regressions, he estimates 
“normalized” equations by imposing the restriction that the sum of 
the dummies’ coefficients must be zero.16 The next section presents 
the estimated regressions and comparisons of the results for each 
analyzed sample based on the Oaxaca-Kuhn wage decomposition 
test. 
5. Results 
This section is divided into three parts. The first part presents the 
results of the bivariate probit model, which were estimated to cor-
rect the selection problems, and the estimated results of the IMR 
coefficients of each of the selection problems. The second part pre-
sents the results obtained by the ordinary least squares method for 
the two sub-samples, while the third part presents results from the 
wage differential findings. 
15 To be more specific, using the characteristics of married women on estimated coefficients 
for the Mincerian wage equation for the married sample yields the wage a married women is 
supposed to receive when she is married. Using the same characteristics of married women 
but the estimated coefficients for the Mincerian wage equation for cohabiting (or single) 
sample gives the wage a married woman would receive if, instead of being married, she was 
cohabiting (or single). Because the estimations consider all the sample characteristics and we 
use the same sample being evaluated in two situations, the difference of these predictions 
represents the difference of wage by marital status alone.
16  This subject is extensively discussed in Scorzafave and Pazello (2007) and Yun (2005).
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5.1  Bivariate Probit
Utilizing the 2000 Demographic Census data that were collected by 
the IBGE, we performed analyses with respect to individual, social, 
and economic characteristics. In addition, we analyzed the wage 
differences between women in consensual unions and those who 
are legally married. Tables 2 and 3 present the results obtained by 
estimating the bivariate probit model for sub-samples of married-
cohabitant and married-single subjects, respectively.
As shown in Tables 2 and 3, when women in consensual unions or 
single women have a greater likelihood of being in the labor market. 
For cohabiting women, this relation can be explained by the fact that 
most women who are involved in informal relationships contribute to 
family income. These women have great influence within the family 
because childrearing and household responsibilities increase the need 
to be in the labor market.
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Table 2 - Bi-Probit of Married × Cohabitant Women
Source: IBGE, data tabulated by the author. 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Married × Cohabitant Probit to be in the labor market Probit to become cohabitant
Constant
-1.525 0.772
-0.005 -0.004
Indicator for cohabitant
0.967 -
-0.007
Resident in urban center
- 0.439
-0.002
Age
- -0.039
-0.00007
Experience
0.071 -
-0.0003
Experience squared
-0.002 -
-5.02E-06
Children < 6 years of age
-0.241 -
-0.002
1 to 4 years of schooling
0.282 -0.332
-0.002 -0.002
5 to 8 years of schooling
0.476 -0.391
-0.003 -0.003
9 to 11 years of schooling
0.871 -0.692
-0.003 -0.003
12 to 15 years of schooling
1.345 -0.843
-0.004 -0.004
Over 15 years of schooling
1.579 -0.796
-0.006 -0.007
Black
0.035 0.48
-0.003 -0.003
Asian
-0.09 -0.148
-0.01 -0.013
Parda
-0.022 0.25
-0.002 -0.002
Indigenous
-0.186 0.626
-0.01 -0.01
North
-0.262 0.468
-0.003 -0.003
Northeast
-0.166 0.232
-0.002 -0.002
Central-West
-0.034 0.136
-0.003 -0.003
South
0.09 -0.025
-0.002 -0.002
Number of observations 3,947,908 3,947,908
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According to the theory of domestic production, the division of labor 
is efficient when each member of the family dedicates his or her 
time to the most productive labor (Becker, 1973). By being more in-
dependent, single women also have a greater probability of entering 
the labor market. 
Women with children under 6 years of age are less likely to be in the 
workforce. Consistent with other studies, maternity is a principal 
factor leads to a woman’s discontinuity in the labor market (Smock, 
2000). The presence of young children leads some mothers to leave 
the labor market to care for their children. Under Brazilian legisla-
tion, businesses are required to give maternity leave to women who 
have children, thus removing these women from the labor market.
With respect to the levels of education among women and consistent 
with the theory of increasing returns of education, the results of the 
probit model show that women with higher levels of education are 
more likely to enter the labor market. 
Est. Econ., São Paulo, vol. 42, n.3, p. 457-487, jul.-set. 2012
476                                                                Regina Madalozzo e Carolina Flores Gomes
Table 3 - Bi-Probit of Married × Single Women
Married × Single Probit to be in the labor market Probit to become single
Constant
-1.117 -0.28
-0.006 -0.008
Indicator for single
0.976 -
-0.017
Resident in urban center
- 0.384
-0.004
Age
- -0.045
-0.0001
Experience
0.61 -
-0.0004
Experience squared
-0.002 -
-6.16E-06
Children < 6 years
-0.242 -
-0.002
1 to 4 years of schooling
0.222 -0.191
-0.003 -0.005
5 to 8 years of schooling
0.42 -0.147
-0.003 -0.006
9 to 11 years of schooling
0.753 -0.101
-0.003 -0.006
12 to 15 years of schooling
1.213 -0.178
-0.004 -0.007
Over 15 years of schooling
1.46 -0.224
-0.007 -0.012
Black
0.165 0.524
-0.004 -0.005
Asian
-0.113 -0.024
-0.011 -0.023
Parda
0.043 0.215
-0.002 -0.003
Indigenous
0.051 0.198
-0.014 -0.023
North
-0.132 0.243
-0.004 -0.005
Northeast
-0.113 0,123
-0.002 -0.003
Central-West
0.002 0.02
-0.003 -0.02
South
0.096 -0.094
-0.002 -0.004
Number of observations 2,953,074 2,953,074
Source: IBGE, data tabulated by the author. 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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In the two sub-samples, the greater the number of years of schoo-
ling, the greater the likelihood of women participating in the labor 
market. On the other hand, when we examine the likelihood of wo-
men engaging in a consensual union, the greater the educational level 
of the woman, the less likely she is to choose an informal union, 
indicating that cohabitation is still largely practiced by women with 
lower educational levels. Thus, a higher level of education increases 
the probability of entering the labor market and decreases the like-
lihood of cohabitation. Considering the experience of the women in 
the sample, more experienced women are more likely to be in the 
labor market. Experience sends a positive signal to employers and 
increases the chances of employment and market integration. The 
fact that these women have many years of experience suggests grea-
ter stability to market agents and, consequently, a reduced likelihood 
of a work interruption.
In agreement with earlier studies, cohabitation seems to be more fre-
quent among younger groups. An increase in age leads to a decrease 
in the probability of entering an informal union. This fact leads us to 
observe that older women find greater stability by choosing formal 
unions; however, in Brazil, as in other Latin American countries, 
informal unions exist among older women as well. Some studies 
indicate that non-white women have a greater participation in the 
labor market, which would lessen the likelihood of discontinuity. In 
the sub-sample that compares cohabitant and married women, only 
black women have a greater probability of being in the labor market 
when compared with white women. Among non-white women, only 
Asian women have a lower probability of being in informal unions. 
In other words, black, parda, and indigenous women have a grea-
ter probability of cohabitating. In the sub-sample comparing single 
and married women, only Asian women have a lower probability 
of being active in the labor market and being in an informal union 
(cohabitation). 
Consistent with the results of Berquó (1998), the informal union 
is a phenomenon of large urban centers. Being a woman residing 
in an urban center increases the probability of being in an infor-
mal union. The sub-sample that analyzes single women shows that 
a woman residing in an urban center increases her probability of 
remaining single. In these two cases, residing in an urban center can 
be a characteristic that indicates a certain level of independence to 
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the market. Considering the two problems of selection and method, 
we obtained two coefficients using the IMR: one for the correction 
in the labor market and the other for the correction of choice in 
marital status. The following sections present the results that were 
obtained from multiple linear regressions for the two sub-samples: 
married/cohabitant women (full time and part time) and married/
single women (full time and part time).
5.2 Married versus Cohabitant Women
In estimating the results to refine the analysis, we separated the two 
sub-samples into two groups, women who work full time (at least 40 
hours per week) and women who work part time (less than 40 hours 
per week).17 This division allows us to investigate the behavior profi-
les of these women and the signals that are passed by women to the 
market according to their dedication (in terms of time) to work. 
In the data that are estimated in Table 4, for women who work 
full time and women who work part time, the probability ratio for 
entering the workforce positively affects the salaries of women, 
whether married or cohabitant. This finding indicates the extent 
to which unobservable characteristics positively influence women’s 
participation in the labor market; as a woman participates, her salary 
should increase. Women with salary-increasing characteristics are 
more prone to entering the labor market. A higher probability of 
choosing marriage positively affects the salaries of married women 
(equally for full-time and part-time workers) but negatively affects 
the salaries of cohabiting women. In other words, women who opt 
for a consensual union suffer reduced salaries.
As anticipated, the number of children decreased salaries for married 
and cohabiting women who worked full and part time. Maternity is 
one of the principal factors leading to women’s discontinuity in the la-
bor market. The presence of children leads some mothers to leave the 
labor market to care for these children (Sedlacek and Santos, 1991). 
Brazilian law requires businesses to give maternal leave to women 
with children, thus removing these women from the labor market. 
17 In the biprobit models for the correction of selection bias, we used a dummy variable for full 
and part time; however, the influence of the variable was not significant. Thus, we decided 
to remove the variable from the model. 
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Table 4 - Multiple Linear Regression Sub-Sample: Married × Cohabitant
Source: IBGE, data tabulated by the author. 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
                                                                             Married Cohabitant
Full time Part time Full time Part time
Constant
-1.442 -0.789 -0.606 -0.296
-0.021 -0.026 -0.031 -0.053
IMR – probability of being in the workforce
1.359 1.073 0.809 0.826
-0.026 -0.033 -0.051 -0.085
IMR – probability of being cohabitant
0.134 0.102 -0.485 -0.529
-0.02 -0.024 -0.026 -0.042
Experience
0.059 0.044 0.048 0.041
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
Experience squared
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
-0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00002 -0.00003
Children
-0.045 -0.035 -0.041 -0.032
-0,001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
1 to 4 years of schooling
0.355 0.351 0.276 0.304
-0.005 -0.008 -0.006 -0.01
5 to 8 years of schooling
0.631 0.646 0.476 0.551
-0.006 -0.009 -0.008 -0.013
9 to 11 years of schooling
1.21 1.191 0.887 0.946
-0.008 -0.011 -0.012 -0.019
12 to 15 years of schooling
2.1 1.959 1.643 1.593
-0.01 -0.013 -0.017 -0.028
Over 15 years of schooling
2.603 2.441 2.083 2.058
-0.011 -0.014 -0.022 -0.035
Black
-0.282 -0.214 -0.225 -0.186
-0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.009
Parda
-0.221 -0.17 -0.165 -0.153
-0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005
Asian
0.303 0.266 0.156 0.212
-0.015 -0.021 -0.03 -0.052
Indigenous
-0.322 -0.208 -0.226 -0.176
-0.018 -0.024 -0.02 -0.032
North
-0.175 -0.171 -0.273 0.197
-0.005 -0.007 -0.006 -0.009
Northeast
-0.45 -0.452 -0.523 0.486
-0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006
Central-West
-0.075 -0.149 -0.153 -0.178
-0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.007
South
-0.107 -0.14 -0.102 -0.16
-0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006
Head of household
0.021 0.05 0.005 0.034
-0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004
Indicator of occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.4848 0.4489 0.4641 0.3705
Number of observations 636,087 382,801 296,213 142,963
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According to the socioeconomic characteristics of these women and 
the theory of increasing returns of education, the higher a woman’s 
education level, the higher the salary level for both married and co-
habiting women is, whether working full time or part time. With re-
gards to race, cohabitating and married Asian women working either 
full or part time have a higher wage premium than white women. 
Considering the geographical region in which women live, the results 
did not differ for married and cohabiting women who work full or 
part time. Women living in the southeast have higher incomes than 
women living in other regions. Finally, when a woman is the head of 
a household, her salary is greater in all cases than those of women 
who are not the heads of the household.
5.3 Married versus Single Women
As shown in Table 5, similar to the married-cohabitant sub-sample 
and regardless of full-time or part-time status, a greater probabi-
lity of entering the workforce positively affects women’s earnings, 
whether married or unmarried, indicating that as women have more 
unobservable characteristics that positively influence their partici-
pation in the labor market, their salaries should increase. A grea-
ter probability of choosing marriage negatively affects the salaries 
of married and single women (equally for full-time and part-time 
workers); however, the impact seems to be greater on the salaries 
of single women, indicating that more women who remain single 
have lower salaries than married women. As maternity is a principal 
factor leading to women’s discontinuity in the labor market for all 
women in the sub-sample, the presence of children negatively affects 
wages. According to the socioeconomic characteristics of these wo-
men and based on the theory of increasing returns of education, a 
higher level of education will generally result in a woman earning 
a higher salary; this trend holds both married and single women, 
regardless of full- or part-time work. With respect to race, among 
single and married women, only Asian women, working both full and 
part time, have a higher wage premium than white women. When 
considering geographic region, the results are similar for married and 
single women who work full- or part-time; however, women who 
live in the southeast region have higher salaries than those living in 
other regions. Finally, if a woman is the head of the household, her 
salary as a married woman increases. However, for single women 
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who work full time, being the head of the family results in lower 
salaries, which could be related to the fact that these women work in 
occupations that do not require skilled labor and, therefore, receive 
lower wages. 
Table 5 - Multiple Linear Regression Sub-Sample: Married × Single 
Source: IBGE, data tabulated by the author. 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
                                                                        Married Single
Full time Part time Full time Part time
Constant
-0.722 -0.229 -0.418 -0.163
-0.025 -0.035 -0.057 -0.112
IMR – probability of being in the workforce
0.547 0.406 0.881 0.951
-0.025 -0.036 -0.108 -0.218
IMR – probability of being single
-0.183 -0.126 -0.439 -0.351
-0.007 -0.01 -0.035 -0.061
Experience
0.045 0.033 0.036 0.031
-0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.005
Experience squared
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
-0.00002 -0.00003 -0.00006 -0.0001
Children
-0.046 -0.036 -0.042 -0.026
-0.0006 -0.0008 -0.003 -0.005
1 to 4 years of schooling
0.308 0.31 0.205 0.221
-0.005 -0.007 -0.015 -0.034
5 to 8 years of schooling
0.541 0.574 0.33 0.404
-0.006 -0.009 -0.018 -0.039
9 to 11 years of schooling
0.989 1.017 0.563 0.696
-0.008 -0.011 -0.024 -0.049
12 to 15 years of schooling
1.79 1.719 1.243 1.313
-0.011 -0.016 -0.033 -0.064
Over 15 years of schooling
2.258 2.172 1.654 1.713
-0.013 -0.019 -0.044 -0.077
Black
-0.271 -0.197 -0.206 -0.145
-0.004 -0.006 -0.01 -0.02
Parda
-0.198 -0.149 -0.153 -0.123
-0.002 -0.003 -0.006 -0.012
Asian
0.299 0.262 0.107 0.266
-0.015 -0.021 -0.054 -0.106
Indigenous
-0.157 -0.072 -0.126 -0.033
-0.018 -0.024 -0.051 -0.112
North
-0.137 -0.143 -0.26 -0.215
-0.005 -0.007 -0.011 -0.02
Northeast
-0.43 -0.437 -0.472 0.465
-0.003 -0.004 -0.007 -0.014
Central-west
-0.068 -0.144 -0.1 -0.094
-0.004 -0.005 -0.009 -0.017
South
-0.115 -0.146 -0.102 -0.162
-0.002 -0.004 -0.008 -0.016
Head of household
0.02 0.05 -0.016 0.001
-0.002 -0.003 -0.005 -0.01
Indicator of occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.4844 0.4483 0.4704 0.3791
Number of observations 636,087 382,801 63,575 22,650
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5.4  The Results of Salary Differences
By assessing the impact of variables on wages presented in Table 6, 
we find that in the married-cohabitants sub-sample, the salaries of 
women in consensual unions and those in formal unions are very dif-
ferent. That is, cohabiting women who work full time earn 3.67 per 
cent more than married women do on average; however, this diffe-
rence is not explained by observable characteristics among women. 
This finding provides strong evidence of problems with information 
asymmetry. In other words, the unobservable characteristics of mar-
ried women represent a large part of the labor differences. When 
we analyze women who work part time, the result changes such that 
cohabitant women earn, on average, 1.32 per cent less than married 
women. This fact seems to be related to the information that women 
in consensual unions provide to the market. 
As much as being engaged in a union (formal or informal) signals 
better life conditions (see Waite and Gallagher, 2000), especially 
for women, this union may represent less freedom to travel, move 
abroad, etc. Our results indicate that employees consider the positive 
effects of women belonging to a couple to be greater for those that 
work full time and less for those that work part time. A full-time 
worker who is also a cohabitant signals a positive selection compa-
red with the female population integrally dedicated to the labor 
market. However, a part-time female worker who is a cohabitant 
sends negative signals by not being in a formal union and indicates 
less dedication to the labor market. Considering these two findings 
together reveals lower wages when compared with part-time female 
workers who are married.
Table 6 - Oaxaca-Kuhn Test of Wage Differences 18
Oaxaca test Married × Cohabitant Married × Single
Full-time work 0.0367 -0.1512
Part-time work -0.0132 -0.1191
Source: IBGE, data tabulated by the author.
18  Tests were performed to find the average differences for the population so as to examine the 
statistical validity of the differential. For all sub-samples, the wage differences are statisti-
cally significant. 
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Analyzing Table 7, among the observable variables, the occupational 
activities that women perform and their educational levels have the 
greatest influence on the wage differences among women.19 For wo-
men who work full time, nearly 38 per cent of the total difference 
between the salaries of cohabitant and married women is due to edu-
cational level. When we analyze women who work part time, nearly 
26 per cent of the difference between the salaries of cohabitant and 
married women is due to educational level, whereas nearly 36 per 
cent is due to occupational activities. 
Table 7 - Variables that Have the Greatest Impact on Wage Differences among 
Married, Single, and Cohabiting Women
Impact on differential Married × Cohabitant Married × Single
Full time Part time Full time Part time
Education Level 37.81% 26.16% 76.93% 63.02%
Occupational Activity 13.09% 35.80% 10.41% 23.33%
Source: IBGE, data tabulated by the author. 
An analysis of the occupational activities of women working part 
time shows that agriculture, domestic services, and manufacturing 
industries provide lower wages for both married women and women 
in informal unions. Among cohabiting women, the lowest salaries are 
paid to those who work in the agricultural sector, whereas among 
married women, domestic services and manufacturing occupations 
are among those most poorly paid. Consular and international acti-
vities and the financial and production sectors are those that offer 
the greatest pay for the two classes of women, respectively. 
From the married-single sub-sample, it is evident that the salaries 
of single and married women are very different in that single wo-
men who work full time earn, on average, 15.12 per cent less than 
married women. When we analyze women who work part time, the 
result is similar, i.e., single women continue to earn, on average, 
11.91 per cent less than married women. This fact could be related 
to characteristics that are linked to age, maturity, and stability that 
these women transmit to agents in the market. 
19 Adjustments were made to test the interpretations of Oaxaca for dummies according to 
Scorzafave and Pazello (2007).
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Just as for the sub-sample of married-cohabitant women depicted in 
Table 7, observable variables with the greatest influence on the wage 
differences of these women are that their occupations and educa-
tional levels.20 In the case of women who work full time, nearly 77 
per cent of the total difference between the salaries of single and 
married women is due to their educational levels. Nearly 10 per cent 
of the total difference between the salaries of these women is due to 
occupational activity. When we analyze women who work part time, 
nearly 63 per cent of the total difference between salaries of single 
and married women is due to educational levels, whereas nearly 23 
per cent of the total difference between the salaries of these women 
is due to their occupation.
Women who hold part-time positions or work in the agriculture, do-
mestic services, and manufacturing industries have the lowest wages 
for both married and single women. For single and married women, 
the lowest wages are paid to those working in manufacturing. The 
consular and international sectors and the financial and production 
sectors are pay better for the two classes of women, respectively. 
6. Final Considerations
The primary objective of this study was to investigate the wage di-
fferences of women according to their marital status. The motivation 
was the marriage premium that is estimated for male wages and the 
previous marriage penalty estimated for women residing in other 
countries (as Madalozzo, 2008, and Kiernan, 2002). In addition, 
cohabitation has been becoming more popular in Brazil in recent 
years, primarily in urban centers, which encouraged the study of 
the effects of this new marital choice with respect to female wages. 
Using 2000 census data and controlling for the two selection pro-
blems and using econometric techniques that have been specified in 
Lee (1983) and Oaxaca (1973), we used OLS to investigate the wage 
differences for women from two sub-samples: married-cohabitant 
and married-single women. 
20  As cited above, adjustments were made to test the interpretations of Oaxaca for dummies 
according to Scorzafave and Pazello (2007).
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The empirical results from multiple linear regressions show that 
women in informal unions who work in full-time jobs have greater 
earnings than those in formal unions. These results indicate an in-
formation asymmetry problem. That is, by some measure, being in 
an informal union means – to employees – that a woman is more 
productive than if she were married (because the woman in an infor-
mal union signals her ability to have a partner and still have freedom 
to move, travel, stay longer hours at work, etc.), and accordingly, 
married women earn lower wages than cohabitants when working 
full time. For women who work part time, the situation is inverted: 
cohabiting women earn a lower salary compared with married wo-
men. Our interpretation of this latter result is that, although this 
cohabiting woman has a better life condition by living with a partner 
(Waite and Gallagher, 2000), her union is less stable than a formal 
marriage and she signals less attachment to the labor market by 
being a part-time worker. When we analyze single women, whether 
they work full time or part time, single women have lower wages 
than married women. These results reflect the problem of percep-
tions of characteristics that are related to maturity, experience, and 
the establishment of women by agents of the market. 
On the basis of the method used by Scorzafave and Pazello (2007), 
among the observable variables analyzed for the two sub-samples, 
women’s occupations and educational levels have the greatest im-
pacts on wage differences. For women working full time in the two 
sub-samples, educational level has a greater impact on wage differen-
ces. For women who work part time, occupational activity has the 
strongest effect on wage differences. 
This study’s contribution is demonstrating that the problems of 
selection in the workforce and choosing marital status should be 
considered when assessing the status of women in the workforce; 
otherwise, there will be bias problems in the final results. After 
controlling for the two selection problems, we arrive at a consistent 
estimate of the wage differences and the conclusion that there is a 
penalty for cohabiting. The results illustrate that, according to the 
working position, the impact of the conjugal status may vary. 
Est. Econ., São Paulo, vol. 42, n.3, p. 457-487, jul.-set. 2012
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